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Abstract 
This article identifies an important channel through which excess control rights affect firm value.  
Using a new, hand-collected data set on corporate ownership and control of 3,468 firms in 22 
countries during the 1996–2008 period, we find that the cost of debt financing is significantly 
higher for companies with a wider divergence between the largest ultimate owner’s control rights 
and cash-flow rights and investigate factors that affect this relation.  Our results suggest that 
potential tunneling and other moral hazard activities by large shareholders are facilitated by their 
excess control rights.  These activities increase the monitoring costs and the credit risk faced by 
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1. Introduction 
 
The separation of ownership and control has long been viewed as the key to the 
analysis of the modern corporation, in which the classic agency conflict is set between 
shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  It has been widely documented, 
however, that for most publicly traded firms around the world, ownership and control 
often vest with dominant shareholders. 1  Moreover, the widespread use of pyramid 
ownership structures, dual-class shares, and cross-holdings typically enables large 
shareholders to exercise effective control over a company with a relatively small direct 
stake in the cash-flow rights.2  In such firms, the primary agency conflict is between 
large controlling shareholders and other investors, and the divergence between control 
rights and cash-flow rights creates a separation of ownership and control that aggravates 
these conflicts (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).   
  Despite the widespread divergence between control and cash-flow rights (the 
“control-ownership wedge”), there is limited evidence on the financial implications of the 
wedge.  Most studies focus on the relation between the control-ownership wedge and 
corporate valuation and find that the deviation between control rights and cash-flow rights 
is associated with lower firm value.3  Examining the link between the control-ownership 
wedge and firm value is one way to gauge the financial implications of the separation of 
                                                             
1 La Porta et al. (1999) examine the ownership structure of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies 
and find that the firms are typically controlled by families or the state.  Claessens et al. (2000) examine the 
separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries and find that more 
than two-thirds of firms are controlled by a single large shareholder.  Faccio and Lang (2002) study 5,232 
corporations in 13 Western European countries and find similar results. 
 
2 For example, see La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), and 
Lemmon and Lins (2003). 
 
3 For instance, Claessens et al. (2002) find that a one-standard-deviation increase in the excess control 
rights of the largest shareholder is associated with a 5% decrease in firm value.  Lemmon and Lins (2003) 
show that during the East Asian financial crisis, the stock returns of firms with separated control and 
cash-flow rights are 10% to 20% lower than those of other firms.  In more recent studies, Laeven and 
Levine (2008) examine European firms with multiple large owners, and Gompers et al. (2010) study excess 
control rights for corporate insiders; both papers find similar patterns.   
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ownership from control.  Empirical estimation of this relation does not, however, identify 
how the wedge affects corporate values.  Moreover, the extant literature on controlling 
shareholders and the consequences of ownership-control deviation typically takes on the 
perspective of equity holders.  In this paper, we identify an important channel through 
which the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights affects firm values.  
Specifically, we examine the impact of control rights-cash-flow rights divergence on 
firms' costs of borrowing.  
Existing theories propose a straightforward connection between the control-ownership 
wedge of a firm’s controlling shareholder and the firm’s ability to raise external debt 
finance.  Since large shareholders pursue their own interests, they may seek to 
expropriate other investors by diverting firm resources for their own use, transferring 
assets and profits out of companies, or committing funds to unprofitable projects that 
provide private benefits.  Their incentives to engage in “tunneling” and other moral 
hazard activities are especially severe when their control rights are significantly in excess 
of their cash-flow rights because they have a greater ability to divert corporate resources 
for private benefits while at the same time bearing a smaller proportion of the financial 
consequence of such activities (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Johnson et al., 2000a).4  
Many of these activities increase the probability of costly lower-tail outcomes,5 thus 
                                                             
4 As discussed in Johnson et al. (2000a, 2000b), the tunneling activities by controlling shareholders 
include various self-dealing transactions such as outright theft or fraud, expropriation of corporate 
opportunities, transfer pricing, asset sales or transfers to controlling shareholders or other corporations they 
control at favorable prices, loan guarantees using the firm’s assets as collateral, etc.  Johnson et al. (2000a) 
report a vivid example in the case of Barro, a Belgian company, with Flambo as its controlling shareholder.  
Minority shareholders of Barro sued Flambo, arguing that Flambo pledged Barro as collateral to guarantee 
Flambo’s debt, forced Barro to acquire new shares of Flambo, withdrew money from Barro’s accounts 
without repayment, diverted an important contract from Barro to Flambo, and used Barrow’s utilities without 
payment.  More examples can be found in Lemmon and Lins (2003). 
 
5 See, for example, Gilson and Villalonga (2009), for a recent case on Adelphia Communications 
Corporation’s bankruptcy, the eleventh largest bankruptcy case in history.  The case highlights the potential 
expropriation of other investors by large, controlling shareholders such as founding families, who retain their 
controls through the dual-class share structure.   
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increasing the expected costs associated with financial distress and bankruptcy.6  In 
addition, potential tunneling activities could impair the value of collateral, which in turn 
reduces the recovery rates in the event of a default. 7   Since creditors incorporate 
expectations about financial distress costs and bankruptcy states into their lending 
decisions, a higher likelihood of negative outcomes results in higher financing costs.  
Moreover, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the problem of expropriation by 
controlling shareholders might become more severe when other investors are of a different 
type (e.g., creditor).  Holding cash-flow rights constant, greater control rights (i.e., larger 
wedge) may provide extra risk-taking incentives to controlling shareholders because they 
may be able to use their effective control rights to divert the upside gains for private 
benefits while leaving the costs of failure to creditors.  This potential effect aggravates 
the agency problem faced by the creditors and therefore, might also result in an increase in 
the cost of debt financing. 
  In this paper we examine the relation between the control-ownership wedge of a 
firm’s largest shareholder and the firm’s cost of bank debt using a new, hand-collected 
data set on corporate ownership and control of 3,468 firms in 22 Western European and 
East Asian countries during the period from 1996 to 2008.  We compute the cash-flow 
and voting rights of the ultimate largest owner of each firm and obtain detailed 
information on 13,331 bank loans made to the sample firms.  We focus on the 22 
countries in East Asia and West Europe because firms in these countries exhibit far more 
divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights than do U.S. firms and because 
                                                             
6 These costs include direct bankruptcy costs, such as lawyers' charges, administrative and accounting 
fees, expert witness expenses, as well as indirect costs due to the potential loss of customers, suppliers, 
employees, and growth opportunities (Purnanandam, 2008).  Indirect financial distress costs can be much 
greater than direct costs, amounting to 20% of firm value in some cases (Bris et al., 2006). 
 
7 As summarized by Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton (2003), many bankruptcy cases in countries such 
as Russia and Thailand were associated with complete looting by controlling shareholders so that creditors 
received almost nothing when the firms went out of business.  Similar outcomes in Mexico were reported 
by La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa (2003).  Akerlof and Romer (1993) provide a theoretical 
discussion. 
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previous studies based on these countries show a significant value discount for firms with 
deviation between cash-flow rights and control rights.8  We focus on private credit 
agreements in the syndicated loan market (rather than, say, bond indentures) because this 
market has been the largest source of corporate financing worldwide over the past two 
decades (Ivashina, 2009).  Indeed, Nini et al. (2009) report that roughly 80% of all public 
firms in the U.S. have private credit agreements in place, while only about 15% of those 
firms have public debt, and this difference is likely to be larger in countries like those in 
our sample that do not have well-developed public debt markets.   
Our results indicate that the cost of debt financing is significantly higher at companies 
with a wider divergence between the largest owner’s control rights and cash-flow rights.  
We define the control-ownership wedge as the difference between the control rights and 
cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Holding constant the 
cash-flow rights of the largest owner, and various borrower characteristics, loan 
characteristics, and macroeconomic factors, a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
control-ownership wedge increases the average loan spread by approximately 14% to 19%, 
or 27 to 38 basis points, depending on the model specification.  The effect of the wedge 
on loan spreads is statistically significant at the 1% level.  The magnitude of the impact 
suggests that the effect of the separation of ownership and control on the cost of borrowing 
is economically significant, as well.9   
The strong effect of ownership structure on loan spreads is robust to a series of 
different test specifications.  It is consistent with the hypothesis that the separation of 
                                                             
8 See, for example, Claessens et al. (2000), Claessens et al. (2002), Faccio and Lang (2002), Lemmon 
and Lins (2003), and Laeven and Levine (2008). 
 
9 The magnitude of the loan spread increase is also economically significant compared to those 
identified in other studies on loan pricing.  For example, Bharath et al. (2009) find that the cost of 
borrowing from a relationship lender is ten basis points lower than the cost of borrowing from a 
non-relationship lender.  Chava et al. (2009) show that increasing the takeover vulnerability index of a firm 
by one standard deviation increases its average loan spread by 12 basis points.  
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ownership from control increases the likelihood of tunneling and other moral hazard 
activities by the controlling shareholder and thereby increases the monitoring costs and the 
credit risk faced by banks.  Lenders therefore raise the price of loans, and the borrower 
incurs a higher cost of debt as a result.    
We also investigate the mechanisms through which the credit risk and the associated 
monitoring costs induced by the deviation between control rights and cash-flow rights at 
the borrowing firm can be mitigated.  We examine factors that influence the relation 
between the control-ownership wedge and the loan spreads.  The idea is that the effect of 
the control-ownership wedge on the cost of bank debt should be particularly strong in 
situations where the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights is more likely 
to result in tunneling and other detrimental activities by the largest owner and thereby 
increase the credit risk.  Conversely, the effect should be weakened by mechanisms that 
curb such activities or reduce the credit risk and the monitoring costs faced by lenders.   
We focus on the following sets of factors: ownership identity, borrowing firm 
opaqueness, credit ratings, loan terms, legal rights (i.e., creditor and shareholder rights), 
and debt enforcement efficiency.  We find that the effect of the control-ownership wedge 
on bank loan spreads is more pronounced if the borrowing firm is family-owned and if its 
CEO is also a member of the controlling family.  The effect is also amplified for firms 
with higher degrees of informational opacity.  It is greater for small firms, firms without 
debt ratings, firms that are not included in a national major stock index, and those with 
relatively meager analyst coverage.  The effect is also greater for firms with lower credit 
ratings.  Furthermore, the effect varies with loan type and maturity, being larger for bullet 
loans and increasing with loan maturity.  On the other hand, the presence of collateral 
and loan covenants appears to mitigate the potential conflicts between large shareholders 
and creditors and weakens the link between the control-ownership wedge and loan spreads.  
Similarly, our results suggest that laws and institutions that constrain self-dealing and asset 
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substitution activities moderate the relation between excess control rights and the cost of 
bank debt.  Strong shareholder rights tend to reduce self-dealing and tunneling activities 
(Djankov et al., 2008b) while strong creditor rights grant more power to creditors in 
bankruptcy and deter risk-shifting behaviors (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Houston et al., 
2010).  We find that stronger shareholder rights (anti-self-dealing) and creditor rights and 
more efficient debt enforcement (Djankov et al., 2008a) all have a direct negative impact 
on loan spreads.  It is more interesting, though, that the interactions between the legal 
rights and the control-ownership wedge imply that stronger protection of shareholder and 
creditor rights and more efficient debt enforcement reduce the effect of excess control 
rights on loan spreads. 
Finally, we use the global banking crisis database compiled by Honohan and Laeven 
(2005) to examine the relation between ownership structure and the cost of bank debt 
during financial crises.  As Lemmon and Lins (2003) point out, financial crises represent 
a relatively exogenous shock, at least with respect to any individual firm, that significantly 
lowers the available return on investment of firms in the affected countries.  Holding 
ownership structure constant, this shock to returns lowers the marginal cost to controlling 
shareholders of diverting resources away from profitable investment projects and increases 
the expected level of expropriation (Johnson et al., 2000b).  Therefore, the 
control-ownership wedge should have a larger effect on the cost of debt financing during 
crisis periods.  Indeed, we find that this effect is particularly prominent when a country 
experiences a banking crisis, especially when the country has poor protections for 
shareholder rights and creditor rights. 
The aforementioned analyses focus on the tunneling perspective of the controlling 
shareholders.  However, empirical evidence also suggests “propping” activities by 
controlling shareholders within affiliated firms (Mitton, 2002; Friedman, Johnson, and 
Mitton, 2003).  As Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton (2003) point out, the controlling 
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shareholders have incentives to transfer funds to a specific firm from other affiliates in a 
business group in order to preserve their options to expropriate the future profits of the 
firm.  This kind of wealth transfer within business groups is more likely to occur from the 
firms in which the controlling shareholders have low ownership stakes to the firms in 
which they have high ownership stakes (Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan, 2002).  For 
example, assume that a controlling shareholder owns b% of firm B, which in turn owns c% 
of firm C.  The controlling shareholder may expropriate firm C to prop up firm B.  In 
such cases, looting may benefit B’s creditors while hurting C’s creditors.10  To assess this 
potential propping effect, we keep track of the borrowing firm’s position in the ownership 
chain and determine the value of the assets that lie underneath the firm that could 
potentially be used to prop it up.  Our results indicate that, consistent with the propping 
effect, the more assets that could potentially be used to prop up a borrowing firm, the 
lower is its cost of debt financing.  More important, we find that the borrowing firm’s 
potential for being propped up attenuates the effect of the control-ownership wedge on 
loan spreads.  In other words, the effect of the control-ownership wedge on the cost of 
bank debt is less pronounced in firms with high propping potentials. 
Another potential problem for interpreting our results is the issue of endogeneity.  
Since loan spreads are largely set by the creditors and by competitive forces in the market 
for loanable funds, it is not very likely that the loan spreads would affect corporate 
ownership and control.  However, borrowers with certain ownership structures might 
have other firm-specific characteristics unaccounted for in our study that affect both the 
control-ownership separation and the cost of borrowing.  The joint determination of 
ownership structure and an unobserved or uncontrolled factor could potentially bias our 
                                                             
10 It is not always true that lending to firm B is safer than lending to firm C.  For instance, suppose 
that firm B is a holding company whose sole income is the $10 dividend that it receives from C and that firm 
B needs to pay its creditors $10 to stay current on its debt.  Then C’s creditors might be safer than B’s 
because if the controlling shareholders steal too much from C, it would cause B to go bankrupt. The average 
effect is an empirical question that we will explore in this paper.  
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results.  The interaction results from sharper tests focusing on factors (e.g., the exogenous 
crisis shock) that influence the relation between the control-ownership wedge and the 
borrowing cost help to alleviate this concern because they are less susceptible to the 
endogeneity biases.   
To further ameliorate the problem, we use two strategies.  In the spirit of Laeven and 
Levine (2009), we use the initial industry average difference between control rights and 
cash-flow rights and the initial industry average cash-flow rights for each borrower as 
instruments for the borrower’s control-ownership wedge and largest-owner cash-flow 
rights, respectively.  The industry averages are country-specific and are measured in the 
year prior to the start of our sample.  Thus, we avoid the simultaneity problem.  The 
industry average ownership structure is correlated with borrowers’ ownership structures 
but is unlikely to directly influence the loan spreads of any particular firm except through 
the borrower’s control-ownership wedge and largest-owner cash-flow rights.  
Furthermore, industry-level ownership structure measures are very stable over time in 
each country, and we control for macroeconomic factors as well as industry fixed effects, 
alleviating the concern that some country-level and industry-level factors might affect an 
entire industry’s ownership structure and cost of debt.  If the endogeneity problem is 
specific to firms, but not to industries or locations, then netting out this firm-specific 
component yields a wedge measure that only depends on the underlying characteristics 
inherent to particular industries or locations (Lin et al., 2010).  We examine also the 
effect of a change in the borrower’s ownership structure on the change in loan spreads.  
Focusing on changes accounts for any time-invariant common unobservable or omitted 
firm-specific characteristics that might affect both the ownership structure and the cost of 
bank debt.  Our results remain economically and statistically strong under either the 
instrumental variables approach or the change regressions approach.  Though it is 
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impossible to completely eliminate endogeneity concerns, endogeneity seems unlikely to 
account for or to bias our empirical findings.      
Taken together, our results suggest that tunneling and other moral hazard activities by 
large shareholders are facilitated by the divergence between control rights and cash-flow 
rights.  These activities, on average, increase monitoring costs and credit risks faced by 
banks and, in turn, raise the cost to borrowers of bank debt.  The paper contributes to a 
number of related literatures.  With regard to the ownership literature, our findings show 
that the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights has a first-order effect on 
firm debt financing and shed direct light on a channel through which such divergence 
affects firm value.  Masulis et al. (2009) examine the divergence for insiders in a sample 
of U.S. dual-class firms and find that, as the deviation between control rights and 
cash-flow rights of corporate insiders widens, corporate cash holdings are worth less to 
outside shareholders, and acquisitions and capital expenditures are less likely to be 
value-creating, while CEOs receive higher compensations.  Our study is among the first 
to focus on the creditors’ perspective and to examine creditors' evaluation of the 
separation of ownership from control.  Therefore, our paper adds to the bank loan 
literature (e.g., Graham et al., 2008; Bharath et al., 2009; Ivashina, 2009) by showing that 
ownership structure is an important determinant of loan pricing.  Finally, our results also 
contribute to a small but growing line of research on how laws and institutions affect bank 
lending activities (e.g., Esty and Megginson, 2003; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Houston et al., 
2010). 
     The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the data 
and the construction of the ownership variables.  Section 3 presents the empirical results.  
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and variables 
     10 
 
 
2.1. Sample construction 
 
We begin our sample construction process with the combined data sets used in 
Claessens et al. (2000) for nine East Asian economies, and in Faccio and Lang (2002) for 
13 Western European countries.  These two data sets provide the ultimate ownership of 
the corporations in 22 Western European and East Asian countries for the period from 
1996 to 1999.11  We then check the Dealscan database for available loan contract 
information in the 22 countries during the period from 1996 to 2008.  Our manual 
data-gathering process starts with a sample of 13,331 loan contracts collected from 
Dealscan for which we have firm ownership information from Factset, OSIRIS, or 
Worldscope.  We then use the Factset, OSIRIS, and Worldscope global ownership 
databases to track the ownership chains of each borrower and hand-collect information on 
the borrower’s ultimate ownership and control.  We start our search in OSIRIS.  For 
ownership information not available in OSIRIS, we search Factset and Worldscope.  
Following La Porta et al. (1999) and Laeven and Levine (2008), we define a shareholder 
as “large” if its direct and indirect voting rights sum to 10% or more.  Our results are 
robust to using different thresholds, such as 20%.  If no shareholder holds 10% or more 
of the voting rights, the firm is classified as widely held.  While direct ownership 
involves shares held under the shareholder’s name, indirect ownership involves shares 
held by entities that the ultimate shareholder controls (Laeven and Levine, 2008).  
Because the large shareholders of corporations are often corporations themselves, we 
identify the large shareholders in these corporations by tracing backward the “knotty” 
                                                             
11 The 13 Western European countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  The nine East Asian countries 
(regions) include Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Thailand. 
 
     11 
 
control chains through numerous corporations to identify the ultimate controlling 
shareholders.  This yields a firm-level ownership data set for 3,468 individual firms in 22 
countries over 1996 to 2008.  We obtain and calculate additional information about these 
firms from Worldscope on firm characteristics, such as firm size, profitability, Q, 
tangibility, cash-flow volatility, etc.12     
 
2.2. Computation of cash-flow rights and control rights 
 
To study the separation of ownership and control, we require data on both cash-flow 
rights and control rights, which we calculate using the complete chain of corporate 
ownership.  We construct the ultimate ownership and control measures in a manner 
consistent with the previous ownership literature (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and 
Lang, 2002; Laeven and Levine, 2008).  We describe briefly the computation below. 
Direct ownership is defined as direct cash-flow rights.  To compute indirect 
cash-flow rights, we multiply the cash-flow rights along the ownership chain until we 
reach the ultimate owner of the firm.  For example, if firm A owns fraction b of firm B, 
and firm B in turn owns fraction c of firm C, and both b and c are greater than the 10% 
threshold, then firm A’s indirect cash-flow rights in firm C is the product of b and c.  We 
add direct and indirect cash-flow rights to arrive at the aggregate cash-flow rights.  
Similarly, we add direct and indirect control rights to arrive at the aggregate control rights.  
Control rights can differ from cash-flow rights due to pyramidal structures, dual-class 
                                                             
12 The 1996–1999 ownership data are from Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002), where 
ownership for each firm is computed at some point during the period from 1996 to 1999.  We augment the 
ownership data for the remaining years (2000–2008).  To make the hand-collection workloads manageable, 
we follow the previous studies and update the ownership information in three block periods: 2000–2003, 
2004–2006, and 2007–2008.  We chose years 2002, 2005, and 2007 as the base years to collect the firm 
ownership information.  If we cannot find the firm ownership in these years, we search the other years in 
the block period.  As La Porta et al. (1999) and Faccio and Lang (2002) point out, ownership structures 
tend to be stable over short time periods. 
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shares, and multiple control chains.  In the chain of control, control rights are measured 
by the weakest link.  In the above example, firm A’s control rights in firm C is min(b, 
c).13  To determine effective control at intermediate levels and at the ultimate level, we 
follow the previous studies (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002) and use 10% 
as the threshold above which we assume that the shareholder has effective control over the 
intermediate and final corporations.  If no owner of the firm has 10% of the voting rights, 
the firm is classified as widely held.  The largest ultimate owner is defined as the ultimate 
owner that has the greatest control rights. 
Following the above procedure, we compute the cash-flow rights and control rights 
measures for our sample firms.  Our key measure, the control-ownership wedge, captures 
the deviation between control rights and cash-flow rights.  It is defined as the difference 
between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  
This definition follows La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000), Claessens et al. 
(2002), Faccio and Lang (2002), and Laeven and Levine (2008), among others.  Our 
results are robust to using the ratio of control to cash-flow rights to compute the wedge 
instead of the difference between the rights. 
 
2.3. Loan spreads 
 
Our measure for loan pricing is from Dealscan, which allows us to identify deal-level 
data in each year, and to observe various terms of the loans at origination, including the 
interest rate, the maturity of the loan, the size of the loan, and the purpose of the loan.  
                                                             
13 Claessens et al. (2002) provide a simple numerical example.  Suppose that a family owns 11% of 
the stock of publicly traded firm A, which in turn has 21% of the stock of firm B.  Then the family owns 
about 2% (11% x 21%) of the cash-flow rights of firm B, the product of the two ownership stakes along the 
chain, and 11% of the control rights in firm B, the weakest link in the chain of control rights.  See 
Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) for many more complex examples and detailed 
discussions. 
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We use the all-in-spread drawn as the measure of the interest rate charged on a loan 
facility.  This measures the basis point spread over the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) or LIBOR equivalent on a loan plus associated loan origination fees.  Thus, it is 
an all-inclusive measure of loan price (Bharath et al., 2009).  To mitigate the effect of 
skewness in the data, we use the natural logarithm of the loan spread (Graham et al., 2008; 
Chava et al., 2009). 
 
 
2.4. Control variables 
 
To assess the impact of the control-ownership wedge on loan spreads, we control for 
other factors that might affect loan pricing.  These factors include borrower 
characteristics, loan characteristics, macroeconomic factors, as well as borrower industry 
and year fixed effects.  The reasons for including these control variables in loan spread 
models are relatively well-known, so we provide only a brief discussion below.  Detailed 
definitions for all the variables used in the paper are provided in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
We control for borrower firm characteristics.  Firm characteristics that we control for 
include firm size, leverage, Q, profitability, asset tangibility, and cash-flow volatility.  
We expect large firms to suffer less from information asymmetries in the credit markets 
than small firms.  Larger firms have longer track records and are followed by more 
financial analysts.  As a result, larger firms should command lower loan spreads, other 
things equal.  Profitable, low-leverage firms and firms with stable cash flows have lower 
probabilities of default and are thus also expected to have lower loan spreads.  In addition, 
all else equal, firms with more tangible assets may offer higher recovery values in default 
states, which may imply lower spreads on their loans.  Predictions are less clear-cut for 
the market-to-book ratio or Q (Graham et al., 2008).  It is possible that the 
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market-to-book ratio proxies for risk or, alternatively, that it proxies for additional value 
(over liquidation) that is left to creditors in distress states.  
We also control for loan-specific characteristics that prior literature has shown to 
affect spreads (Graham et al., 2008).  We control for the natural log of loan size because 
there may be economies of scale in bank lending.  If so, the loan spread would be 
negatively related to loan size.  We further control for loan maturity because banks might 
face greater uncertainty and higher credit risk in loans carrying relatively long maturities.  
Loans that include contingent performance-based pricing may differ from loans without 
such clauses.  To control for this possibility, we use a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if there is performance-based pricing.  In addition, we use dummy variables 
to control for the likelihood that different types of loans (term loans and revolvers) and 
loans granted for different purposes (working capital or general corporate purpose, 
refinancing, acquisition, commercial paper backup, and others) might carry different risks 
and may therefore be priced in different ways. 
Because data are unavailable, some other potentially relevant firm or loan 
characteristics are not directly observable.  For instance, an important determinant of loss 
given default is subordination, which defines inter-creditor priority in the event of 
bankruptcy (Carleton and Delaney, 2009).  Structural subordination specifies that the 
creditors of the parent company can only get paid after the creditors of the operating 
subsidiary have been made whole.  As a result, creditors might deem it safer to lend to 
operating subsidiaries than to the parent company and might stipulate limitations on 
subsidiary borrowing or require upstream guarantees to reduce the impact of structural 
subordination (Carleton and Delaney, 2009).  Because of data limitations in our source 
countries, the subordination information is not readily available.14  To control for these 
                                                             
14 Another piece of information that is of interest is insider ownership.  Higher insider ownership 
might imply better corporate governance and deter moral hazard activities and thus, lower a firm’s 
borrowing cost.  Unfortunately, insider ownership information is not available in our cross-country data.  
Moreover, the interpretation of the effect of insider ownership on the cost of corporate borrowing could be 
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potential factors and isolate the impact of the control-ownership wedge on the cost of debt 
financing, we include the borrower’s Standard & Poor’s (S&P) credit rating in the model.  
In addition, S&P ratings also control for creditworthiness.  Compared to firms with low 
credit ratings or firms without credit ratings, firms with high ratings may obtain more 
favorable loan terms such as lower interest rates (Qian and Strahan, 2007).  As Anthony 
and Puccia (2005) suggest, S&P explicitly states that they take into consideration the 
variations in structural subordination in assigning ratings.  Carleton and Delaney (2009) 
present an intuitive case regarding structural subordination using the Wendy’s/Arby’s 
Group as an example.  The debt of the subsidiaries of the Wendy’s/Arby’s Group was 
rated B by S&P while the debt of the holding company was rated B-.   
We convert the S&P credit ratings into an index from one to six, with one assigned to 
the highest AAA rating.  About 38% of the sample observations do not have a credit 
rating.  We follow previous studies (e.g., Qian and Strahan, 2007) and assign a value of 
seven to the rating of these missing observations to avoid losing them.  To identify these 
observations, we also separately include in the model a dummy variable that takes the 
value one when the firm’s credit rating is missing. 
Macroeconomic factors and legal environments may also affect loan pricing.  
Following previous studies (e.g., Esty and Megginson, 2003; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae 
and Goyal, 2009), we control for factors such as natural log of gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita (proxy for economic development), sovereign risk rating (proxy for 
country risk), and private credit to GDP (proxy for financial development).  Furthermore, 
Qian and Strahan (2007) find that stronger creditor rights reduce loan spreads.  We 
therefore control for creditor rights using the creditor rights index of La Porta et al. (1998) 
and Djankov et al. (2007).15  The aggregate creditor rights index ranges from zero to 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
clouded by the possibility that undiversified owners may avoid risky projects.      
 
15 This index consists of four components:  (1) whether there are restrictions imposed, such as 
creditors’ consent, when a debtor files for reorganization (Restrictions on reorganization); (2) whether 
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four, with higher values indicating stronger creditor rights.  Table 2 provides summary 
statistics for our sample. 




3.1. The effect of the separation of ownership and control on loan pricing 
 
In this section we examine the impact of the separation of ownership and control on 
loan pricing using multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions.  The main 
empirical model we estimate is as follows: 
Log(loan spread) = f(Wedge measure, Borrower characteristics, Loan characteristics,  
         Macroeconomic factors, Industry and time effects).              (1) 
In Eq. (1), the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the loan spread for a single 
bank loan.  All of the results in the paper are qualitatively similar if we use the loan 
spread instead of its natural logarithm as the dependent variable.  The key independent 
variable of interest is a proxy for the deviation between control rights and cash-flow rights, 
the control-ownership wedge.  As detailed in the previous section, other independent 
variables include the cash-flow rights of the firm’s largest ultimate owner and controls for 
other borrower characteristics, loan characteristics, macroeconomic factors, as well as 
borrower industry and year fixed effects.   
[Insert Table 3 here] 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
secured creditors have the ability to seize collateral after the petition for reorganization is approved (No 
automatic stay); (3) whether secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of proceeds from liquidation 
as opposed to other creditors such as employees (Secured creditor paid first); and (4) whether an 
administrator, rather than the incumbent management, is in control of and responsible for running the 
business during the reorganization (No management stay).  A value of one is added to the index when a 
country’s laws and regulations provide each of these powers to secured creditors to arrive at the aggregate 
creditor rights index.  Djankov et al. (2007) extend the creditor rights data set to include annual observation 
across 129 countries over the period from 1978 to 2003. 
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Table 3 reports the regression results.  In columns 1 through 4, we use two dummy 
variables to capture the difference between control rights and cash-flow rights.  The 
High- (Low-) wedge dummy is an indicator variable that equals one if the share of control 
rights of the firm’s largest ultimate owner exceeds the share of cash-flow rights and if this 
difference is higher than (less than or equal to) the median difference in firms where the 
control-ownership wedge is greater than zero.  These dummy variables separate the 
sample firms into three groups according to their control-ownership wedge: no-wedge 
firms, low-wedge firms, and high-wedge firms, and the omitted group is the no-wedge 
group.  In columns 5 through 8, we use the continuous variable, control-ownership 
wedge, directly as the key independent variable instead.   
For each set of regressions we run four specifications.  The first controls for a set of 
borrower characteristics only, including the cash-flow rights of the borrower’s largest 
ultimate owner.  The second adds controls for loan characteristics as well as industry and 
year fixed effects.  The third adds controls for macroeconomic factors and the fourth adds 
borrower credit ratings and Q as additional controls.  As discussed previously, we include 
credit ratings to control for borrower creditworthiness as well as unobserved firm and loan 
characteristics such as structural subordination.  Q is used to proxy for the firm's growth 
potential.  Adding these controls might, on the other hand, incur some costs.  If rating 
agencies are aware that ownership structure affects the creditworthiness of the firm, credit 
ratings may already partially factor in the complexity of the borrower's ownership 
structure.  A similar argument applies to the market’s perception and the market value 
(and thus Q) of the firm.  Nevertheless, these effects would work against finding a 
significant impact of the wedge on the cost of borrowing.  Therefore, the estimates based 
on the models with credit ratings and Q as additional controls can be viewed as 
conservative estimates of the effect of the control-ownership wedge on loan pricing.  All 
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p-values reported are based on standard errors that are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
are clustered at the firm level.   
Across all specifications, we see that the cash-flow rights of the borrower’s largest 
ultimate owner are negatively related to loan spreads.  A one-standard-deviation increase 
in cash-flow rights reduces the average loan spread by 8.9% to 10.7% (or 17 to 21 basis 
points), everything else equal.16   Consistent with the literature, we also find that larger 
borrower firm size, better debt ratings, higher profitability, and lower leverage tend to be 
associated with significantly lower bank loan spreads.  Holding the cash-flow rights and 
other factors constant, however, the wedge between control rights and cash-flow rights is 
significantly positively related to the cost of bank debt.  Estimates from columns 1 to 4 
indicate that the average spread on bank loans in firms with a high control-ownership 
wedge is significantly greater than the average loan spread for firms with a low 
control-ownership wedge which, in turn, significantly exceeds the average spread for firms 
with no deviation between control rights and cash-flow rights.  The difference between 
the coefficient estimates on the High-wedge and Low-wedge dummies is significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level in columns 1 to 4 of Table 3.  Similarly, in columns 5 
to 8, the coefficients on the continuous measure of control-ownership wedge are all 
positive and highly significant at the 1% level.17   
A one-standard-deviation increase in the control-ownership wedge increases the 
average loan spread by approximately 18%, or 35 basis points, ceteris paribus (column 7).  
Hence, the effect of the separation of ownership and control on the cost of borrowing is 
economically as well as statistically significant.  After controlling for credit ratings and Q 
                                                             
16 Since the dependant variable of the regression, loan spreads, is in logarithm, the coefficient on an 
independent variable can be interpreted as the percentage change, or the growth rate, in loan spreads as the 
independent variable increases by one unit. 
 
17 For the rest of the paper, we focus on the continuous measure of control-ownership wedge in our 
empirical analysis.  All of our results are qualitatively unchanged if we use the wedge dummies. 
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(column 8), which are both significant at the 10% level, the effect of a 
one-standard-deviation increase in the wedge drops to 14%, or 27 basis points.  This 
suggests that borrower credit ratings and Q partially capture the effects of the borrower's 
ownership structure.18  Despite this, the coefficient on the control-ownership wedge 
remains significant at the 1% level.19  The effect of the control-ownership wedge is also 
economically significant compared to the effect on loan pricing of other factors 
documented in the literature.  For example, Bharath et al. (2009) find that the cost of 
borrowing from a relationship lender is ten basis points lower than the cost of borrowing 
from a non-relationship lender.  Qian and Strahan (2007) show that increasing a country’s 
creditor rights index by one standard deviation reduces the average loan spread in the 
country by 10%. 
 
3.2. Endogeneity of ownership structure and other robustness tests 
 
One concern about our results on the relation between the control-ownership 
separation and bank loan pricing is the issue of endogeneity.  Borrowers with certain 
ownership structures might have other firm-specific characteristics unaccounted for in our 
model that affect both the control-ownership separation and the cost of borrowing.  The 
joint determination of the ownership structure and an unobserved or uncontrolled factor 
could potentially bias the results.  Although it is extremely difficult to completely solve 
the endogeneity problem, in this section, we attempt to address this issue in two ways.  
First, we use instrumental variables for each borrower’s ownership structure.  Second, we 
                                                             
18 In unreported results, we regress S&P firm credit rating on the control-ownership wedge and find a 
significant relation.  The higher is the wedge, the worse is the credit rating.  This suggests that rating 
agencies have taken into account corporate governance considerations when rating issuers.   
 
19 In the remainder of the paper, we use the full set of controls including the credit ratings and Q.  The 
results are highly robust without these controls. 
 
     20 
 
estimate change regressions by examining the effect of changes in borrowers’ ownership 
structures on changes in loan spreads.  In addition, we show that our results are robust to 
various alternative test specifications.  
 
3.2.1. Instrumental variables estimation 
 
To address the concern of endogeneity, we first employ the instrumental variables 
approach.  In the spirit of Laeven and Levine (2009), we use the initial industry average 
difference between control rights and cash-flow rights and the initial industry average 
cash-flow rights for each borrower as instruments for the borrower’s control-ownership 
wedge and largest-owner cash-flow rights, respectively.20  The industry averages are 
country-specific and are measured in the year prior to the start of our sample.  The 
industry average ownership structure is correlated with a borrower’s ownership structure 
(Laeven and Levine, 2009) but is unlikely to directly influence the loan spreads of the 
particular firm except through the borrower’s control-ownership wedge and largest-owner 
cash-flow rights.  Furthermore, the industry-level ownership structure measures are very 
stable over time in each country, and we control for macroeconomic factors as well as 
industry fixed effects.  This alleviates the concern that some country-level and 
industry-level factors might affect an entire industry’s ownership structure and cost of 
debt. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Table 4 reports the regression results using instrumental variables, with log loan 
spread as the dependent variable.  The F-statistics in the first stage (unreported but 
                                                             
20 Laeven and Levine (2009) use the average cash-flow rights of other banks in the country as an 
instrument for a bank’s ownership structure to study the link between bank risk and bank ownership and 
governance.  We thank Mara Faccio for providing the data for the initial average control-ownership wedge 
measure for each industry in each country in our sample. 
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available upon request) indicate that the coefficients on the instruments are significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level.  From the estimates in Table 4, we see that the 
coefficients on the control-ownership wedge in the instrumental variable regressions are 
positive and significant at the 1% level, with even larger magnitudes than the coefficient 
estimates from the OLS regressions.  The coefficients on the cash-flow rights of the 
largest owner remain negative and significant.  These results are consistent with our 
earlier analyses and support the view that the separation of ownership and control 
increases the cost of bank loans for borrowers.  The effect of ownership structure on loan 
spreads remains and is, in fact, strengthened after addressing the potential endogeneity 
problem.   
 
3.2.2. Change regressions 
 
We next examine the effect of changes in borrower ownership structures on changes 
in loan spreads.  Focusing on changes accounts for time-invariant common unobservable 
or omitted firm-specific characteristics that might affect both the ownership structure and 
the cost of bank debt.   
To construct the sample for the change regressions and compute the changes, we 
require that a borrower has at least two bank loans in our sample, each in a different year. 
If a borrower has more than one loan in a given year, we use the first loan observation in 
that year to compute the changes.  The results are qualitatively similar if we randomly 
select a loan in a given year instead of choosing the first.  Since the borrower ownership 
structure tends to be stable over time as mentioned earlier, we drop differenced 
observations if there is no change in the borrower’s control-ownership wedge between two 
periods.21   
                                                             
21 This methodology follows in the fashion of Chava et al. (2009), who use change regression analyses 
to study the effect of corporate takeover defenses on loan costs. 
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[Insert Table 5 here] 
We present the results of the change regressions in Table 5, where the dependent 
variable is the change in log loan spreads and the key independent variable is the change 
in the control-ownership wedge for the borrower.  We control for the change in the 
cash-flow rights of the borrower’s largest owner, as well as changes in various borrower 
characteristics, loan characteristics, and macroeconomic factors.  The results in Table 5 
indicate that, for a given firm, the change in the cash-flow rights of a borrower’s largest 
owner is negatively related to the change in the firm’s loan spreads, everything else equal.  
The change in the borrower’s control-ownership wedge has the exact opposite effect.  An 
increase in the wedge is associated with a significant increase in the loan spread.  These 
results further confirm the findings from the preceding regression analyses. 
 
3.2.3. Other robustness tests 
 
In this section we check the robustness of our results by changing various aspects of 
the test specification.  The results of these robustness tests are not tabulated in the paper 
but they are available upon request.     
In one set of tests we use an alternative definition of excess control rights.  Instead of 
the difference between control rights and cash-flow rights, we examine the ratio of the 
fraction of voting rights controlled by the largest owner to the fraction of cash-flow rights 
controlled by the largest owner.  To address the issue of potential outliers driving the 
results we also re-estimate our regressions in two ways.  We eliminate extreme values by 
winsorizing at the 0.5% level and by using median regressions.  We note also that each 
observation in our base analysis represents a single loan but that a borrower can have 
multiple loans in a given year, with several loans belonging to the same deal package.  
To address the possibility that the loan terms for these facilities might not be negotiated 
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independently, we aggregate multiple loans in two ways to form new observations and 
perform our analyses on these new units.  Specifically, we compute the loan 
size-weighted averages of all the loan terms at the deal level or in any given year for a 
given firm and repeat the regressions using deal-level observations or firm-year 
observations.  In still other tests we eliminate amendments of existing facilities, dropping 
observations where the loan is identified in the Dealscan database as an amended facility.  
Recall that we include loan maturity as a control variable in our regressions of loan 
spreads on ownership structure.  To address the potential endogenous determination of 
spread and maturity in a loan contract, we estimate two-stage least-square regressions 
using the asset maturity for the borrower as an instrument for the loan maturity.22  Finally, 
instead of doing change regressions, we include firm fixed effects in all our regressions to 
explore within-firm differences.  In all of the above robustness tests, our results remain 
statistically and economically significant.  In every case, the estimated coefficients are 
similar in magnitudes to those reported in Table 3.   
Overall, our results from the multivariate regression analyses indicate that the 
deviation between control rights and cash-flow rights is significantly positively related to 
loan spreads.  The link between the control-ownership wedge and loan spreads remains 
economically and statistically significant even after controlling for various borrower 
characteristics, loan characteristics, macroeconomic factors, as well as industry and time 
effects, correcting for potential endogeneity problems, and using a series of different test 
specifications.23  The strong effect of ownership structure on loan spreads is consistent 
                                                             
22 See, for example, Graham et al. (2008) and Bharath et al. (2009) for discussions of the validity of 
using asset maturity as an instrument for debt maturity.  Asset maturity is calculated according to Barclay 
and Smith (1995) and Barclay et al. (2003) as the book value-weighted average of maturity of current assets 
and net property, plant, and equipment. 
 
23 These results are consistent with those reported by Aslan and Kumar (2009), who use simultaneous 
equations to address the joint determination of loan pricing, loan maturity, and the number of participants in 
the syndication in the study of controlling shareholders and loan contracts.  Billett and Liu (2008), who 
study the relation between managerial excess control rights and the cost of debt in a sample of U.S. 
dual-class firms, also find consistent results.     
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with the hypothesis that the separation of ownership and control increases the likelihood of 
tunneling and other potential moral hazard activities by the largest owner and thereby 
increases the monitoring costs and the credit risk faced by banks.  Lenders therefore raise 
the price of loans, and borrowers incur higher debt costs as a result.   
 
3.3. Factors influencing the link between ownership structure and borrowing cost  
 
In this section, we seek to elucidate the mechanisms through which the credit risk and 
the associated monitoring costs induced by the divergence between control rights and 
cash-flow rights at the borrowing firm can be affected.  Specifically, we examine factors 
that influence the relation between the control-ownership wedge and the loan spreads.  
The idea is that the effect of the control-ownership wedge on the cost of bank debt should 
be particularly strong in situations where the deviation between control rights and 
cash-flow rights is more likely to result in tunneling and other potential moral hazard 
activities by the largest owner and thereby increase the credit risk.  Conversely, the effect 
should be weakened by mechanisms that help to curb such activities or to reduce the credit 
risk and the monitoring costs faced by lenders.  We focus on the following sets of factors: 
ownership identity, borrowing firm opaqueness, credit rating, propping potential, loan 
terms, legal rights (i.e., creditor and shareholder rights), and debt enforcement efficiency.  
We also examine the relation between ownership structure and the cost of bank debt 
during financial crises.  
 
 
3.3.1. Ownership identity 
 
Previous studies show that large shareholdings in general, and the separation of 
ownership and control in particular, are often associated with family ownership (e.g., La 
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Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002).  In our sample, 45% of 
the firms are ultimately controlled by families.  As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note, large 
shareholders may have incentives to use their controlling positions in firms to expropriate 
wealth from other investors.  These incentives, however, may vary across different types 
of large owners.  As Villalonga and Amit (2006) point out, if the large shareholder is an 
institution such as a bank, an investment fund, or a widely held corporation, the private 
benefits of control are diluted among many independent owners.  As a result, the large 
shareholder’s tunneling incentives might be weak.  If, on the other hand, the large 
shareholder is an individual or a family, it might have stronger incentives for expropriation.  
Therefore, we categorize the largest ultimate shareholders into families, the state, or 
widely held corporations and financial institutions, and examine whether our results are 
more prominent for particular types of ultimate owners.  We investigate this matter by 
including ownership identity dummies (family, state) and their interactions with the 
control-ownership wedge in our baseline model.  The results of these tests are presented 
in Table 6. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
As can be seen from the first two columns of Table 6, our results show that the 
coefficients of the wedge-family interaction terms are positive and statistically significant.  
These estimates indicate that the positive effect of the wedge on loan spreads is greater for 
firms with families as controlling shareholders.  Consistent with the literature (Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006), these findings imply that tunneling risks are higher in family-controlled 
firms. 
In addition, families often limit executive management positions to family members 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2006) to further strengthen their control over the firm, and in such 
firms, value discounts are more severe (Claessens et al., 2002).  We therefore 
hand-collect information on the CEO-family connection from company filings and 
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executive biographies.  We create a dummy variable, Family CEO, which equals one if a 
firm is family-controlled and the CEO is a family member of the controlling family.  We 
then include this variable and its interaction with the control-ownership wedge in our 
model.24  The coefficients for Wedge, Family, Family CEO, and the two interaction terms 
are all positive and statistically significant.  Hence, the link between the 
control-ownership wedge and the cost of bank loans is stronger for family firms, 
especially if the firm also has a family-related CEO.  To appreciate the economic 
significance of our findings, consider the set of coefficients reported under column 3 of 
Table 6.  These estimates imply that increasing the control-ownership wedge by one 
standard deviation increases loan spreads by 16.2% for firms controlled by widely held 
corporations (the benchmark group), and increases loan spread by 27.4% for 
family-controlled firms with family-connected CEOs.  In other words, a 
one-standard-deviation increase in the control-ownership wedge increases the loan spread 
of a family-controlled firm with a family-related CEO by 21.9 basis points more than a 
similar increase in wedge for a firm controlled by widely held corporations.  In column 4, 
we add the dummy indicating state control and its interaction term with the 
control-ownership wedge.  The loan spreads-wedge sensitivity might be lower in 
state-controlled firms because of their lower default risks due to potential bailouts by the 
state and lower tunneling incentives.  Our empirical results show that loan spreads are 
indeed less sensitive to the wedge in state-controlled firms, as indicated by the negative 
interactive term between State and Wedge. 
 
3.3.2. Borrowing firm informational opacity 
 
                                                             
24 Note that the dummy Family always equals one if Family CEO equals one.  Therefore, we do not 
need to include Family*Family CEO or Family*Family CEO*Wedge in our regressions once Family CEO 
and Family CEO*Wedge are included. 
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Holding ownership structure constant, firm informational opacity might lower the 
marginal costs to controlling shareholders of diverting resources away from the company 
and engaging in other moral hazard activities for private benefits.  As a result, 
informational opacity of the borrowing firm would increase the likelihood and the 
expected level of expropriation and therefore strengthen the relation between the 
control-ownership wedge and the firm’s borrowing cost.  To test this conjecture, we add 
the interaction between informational opacity measures and the wedge to the baseline 
model.  Following Bharath et al. (2009), we use four different measures of informational 
opacity in our tests: firm size (i.e., natural log of assets), whether the firm has a debt rating, 
inclusion in a national major stock index, and the number of analysts following the firm.  
The intuitions for these informational opacity measures are well-known.  We provide 
here only a brief discussion.  Smaller firms and firms without credit ratings tend to have 
less publicly available information, while firms included in the national major stock 
indexes and covered by more stock analysts are likely to be more informationally 
transparent as monitoring by the credit rating agencies and coverage by analysts reduces 
informational asymmetries (Bharath et al., 2009).  We re-estimate our baseline model 
including these informational opacity proxies and their interactions with the 
control-ownership wedge and report the results in Table 7.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
As can be seen from the table, loan spreads are less sensitive to the wedge for larger 
firms, firms included in the national major stock indexes, and firms followed by more 
stock analysts, as indicated by the negative and statistically significant coefficients of the 
interaction terms.  On the other hand, loan spreads are more sensitive to the wedge for 
unrated firms.  Consistent with our expectation, all these results suggest that the effect of 
the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights on the cost of bank loans is 
stronger for firms with higher degrees of informational opacity. 
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3.3.3. Borrowing firm credit rating 
 
The creditworthiness of the borrowing firm might also moderate the relation between 
the control-ownership wedge and loan spreads.  For firms with better creditworthiness, 
the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights might be less of a concern to 
creditors because the likelihood of default is lower.  As a result, the creditworthiness of 
the borrowing firm would weaken the relation between the control-ownership wedge and 
the firm’s borrowing cost.  To test this conjecture, we add the interaction between credit 
quality measures and the control-ownership wedge to the baseline model.  We use two 
different measures of creditworthiness in our tests: the variable S&P rating (as defined 
previously with higher values indicating lower credit quality), and a dummy variable 
Investment grade, which equals one if the credit rating is BBB or better and zero otherwise.  
In Table 8, we report the results of re-estimating our baseline model including these 
creditworthiness proxies and their interactions with the control-ownership wedge.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
The results in Table 8 indicate that the loan spreads-wedge sensitivity is significantly 
higher for borrowers with poor credit ratings (column 1).  Conversely, loan spreads are 
less sensitive to the control-ownership wedge for borrowers with investment-grade ratings 
(column 2).  The effects are both statistically and economically significant.  For instance, 
the coefficients in column 2 imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
control-ownership wedge increases the average loan spreads of a non-investment-grade 
firm by 16.5 basis points more than for an investment-grade firm.  These results are 
consistent with our expectation that the effect of the control-ownership wedge on the cost 
of bank debt is stronger for firms with lower creditworthiness. 
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We also split the sample based on the median credit rating and run separate 
regressions for low- and high-credit rating firms.  We find very consistent results that the 
effect of the ownership-control wedge on bank loan spreads is less pronounced for firms 
with stronger ratings.  For brevity, the results are not reported here in detail but are 
available from the authors upon request. 
 
3.3.4. Borrowing firm propping potential 
 
The pyramid structure for groups of interconnected firms can also facilitate propping 
(Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton, 2003).  The controlling shareholders have incentives to 
transfer funds from other affiliates in a business group to a specific affiliate in order to 
preserve their options to expropriate the future profits of the affiliate.  In particular, funds 
are more likely to be transferred out of firms lower down in the pyramid in which the 
controlling shareholders have low ownership stakes to prop up the firms higher in the 
pyramid in which the controlling shareholders have high ownership stakes (Bertrand et al., 
2002).  Therefore, a borrowing firm’s potential of being propped up should not only 
lower its cost of debt financing but also weaken the effect of the control-ownership wedge 
on loan pricing.25   
To examine the propping effect, we keep track of the borrowing firm’s position in the 
ownership chain and measure the value of the assets that lie underneath the firm and could 
potentially be used to prop it up.  Specifically, we construct two measures to proxy for 
the propping potential of the borrowing firm.  The first measure equals the total value of 
the assets of all firms that lie underneath the borrowing firm's position in the pyramid, 
                                                             
25 Borrowing by groups involves issues more complex than does borrowing by standalone firms.  If 
intra-group lending data were available, we could drill further down and do a more detailed analysis by 
exploring the direction of intra-group lending flows, cross-guarantees, and cross-default clauses.  Another 
interesting issue is the legal treatment of creditors in pyramids and whether or not a country’s bankruptcy 
code allows creditors to “pierce the corporate veil.”  Unfortunately, these data are not available to us.  
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divided by the borrowing firm’s total assets.  The second measure is a weighted sum of 
the values of the assets of all firms that lie underneath the borrowing firm in the pyramid 
divided by the borrowing firm’s total assets.  The weight for each firm lower down in the 
pyramid beneath the borrower is defined as the control rights of the ultimate controlling 
shareholder on that firm.  Thus, the first measure represents an upper bound estimate of 
the value of assets for potential propping while the second represents a more conservative 
measure.  We then re-estimate our baseline model including these proxies for propping 
potential and their interactions with the control-ownership wedge.  The results are 
reported in Table 9.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
We use the first measure for borrowing firm propping potential in columns 1 and 2 in 
Table 9 and the second measure in columns 3 and 4.  The coefficients of the propping 
potentials measures are indeed significantly negative, indicating that potential propping 
lowers the cost of borrowing.  A one-standard-deviation increase in the propping 
measures reduces the average loan spread by approximately 8% to 9%, or 15 to 18 basis 
points.  It is more interesting, however, that our results show that the interaction term 
between the propping potential measure and the control-ownership wedge is also negative 
and statistically significant.  This suggests that the propping potential of the borrowing 
firm weakens the link between the control-ownership wedge and loan spreads.  
 
3.3.5. Loan terms 
 
Various loan attributes, such as loan type, loan maturity, loan covenants, and 
collateral, might moderate the relation between the control-ownership wedge and loan 
spreads.  For example, compared with other types of loans, the expropriation risks might 
be higher for bullet loans since the entire principal would be due at the end of the term as a 
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final payment.  Similarly, tunneling risks might be higher for loans with longer maturity.  
Some contractual terms, such as collateral and loan covenants, can be used by lenders as 
governance mechanisms to mitigate the potential conflicts of interest between large 
shareholders and creditors and to protect creditors against potential expropriation risks 
(Cremers et al., 2007).  We thus expect a weaker link between loan spreads and the 
divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights for loans with collateral 
requirements and restrictive covenants.  We examine these potential effects by including 
variables capturing these loan terms (i.e., loan maturity, the number of loan covenants, 
whether a facility is a bullet loan, and whether a loan has any collateral) and their 
interactions with the control-ownership wedge in our baseline model.  The empirical 
results are presented in Table 10. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
As expected, the estimates in the first two columns of Table 10 suggest that the 
positive effect of the control-ownership wedge on loan spreads is greater for bullet loans 
and loans with longer maturities.  On the other hand, the presence of loan covenants or 
collateral requirements attenuates the effect of excess control rights on loan spreads, as 
indicated by the negative and statistically significant coefficients of the interaction terms 
in the last two columns.  
 
3.3.6. Legal rights and debt enforcement efficiency  
 
Previous studies (e.g., Esty and Megginson, 2003; Qian and Strahan, 2007) highlight 
the importance of law and institutions in shaping loan contracts.  Stronger creditor rights 
grant creditors greater ability and bargaining power to force repayment or to take control 
of firms that default (Qian and Strahan, 2007).  Stronger creditor rights may deter 
tunneling and risk-shifting incentives because creditor rights components, such as 
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restrictions on reorganization and no automatic stay, clearly have more negative 
consequences for the debtor in financial distress.  
Shareholder rights, the legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation 
by corporate insiders, might also exert a direct impact on the link between the 
control-ownership wedge and loan spreads.  Holding ownership structure constant, better 
investor protection reduces private benefits of control and therefore reduces tunneling 
incentives (Djankov et al., 2008b).  We use two measures, Anti-director and 
Anti-self-dealing, of the shareholder rights (La Porta et al., 1998; Djankov et al., 2008b) to 
gauge the level of protection of investors from insider stealing and self-dealing by 
controlling shareholders.26   
In addition to the codified rights, the efficiency of debt enforcement might also matter.  
Institutions for resolving insolvency cases generally perform poorly, especially in 
developing countries but also in developed countries to some extent (Djankov et al., 
2008a).  For example, according to the anecdotal evidence summarized by Friedman, 
Johnson, and Mitton (2003), creditors in bankruptcy cases in Thailand ultimately receive 
very little through a process that normally takes up to ten years.  More efficient debt 
enforcement shortens the time and reduces the costs involved in a typical insolvency case 
and can therefore lower the spreads the lenders charge.  We use two measures 
constructed by Djankov et al. (2008a) to proxy for the efficiency of debt enforcement.  
Time to payment measures the estimated number of years from the moment of a firm's 
                                                             
26 The anti-director index (La Porta et al., 1998; Djankov et al., 2008b) is formed by adding one when: 
(1) shareholders are allowed to mail in their proxy votes to the firm; (2) shareholders are not required to 
deposit their shares before any general shareholders’ meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional 
representation of minorities in the board is allowed; (4) minority shareholders have legal mechanisms 
against perceived oppression by the board of directors; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that 
entitles a shareholder to call for a special shareholders’ meeting is no more than 10%; or (6) shareholders 
have preemptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote.  The index ranges from zero to six 
with higher values indicating stronger investor protection against insider expropriation.  The 
anti-self-dealing index is computed based on the survey of a hypothetical self-dealing case among attorneys 
from Lex Mundi law firms in 102 countries (Djankov et al., 2008b).  Higher values indicate better 
protection of investors against self-dealing by controlling shareholders. 
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default to the time when the secured creditor gets paid in each country.  Cost of debt 
enforcement proxies for the estimated cost of the insolvency proceeding borne by all 
parties as a percentage of the value of the insolvent estate in each country.   
In Table 11, we report the results for regressions that include the measures for creditor 
rights, shareholders rights, and debt enforcement efficiency, and their respective 
interactions with the control-ownership wedge.  
[Insert Table 11 here] 
As discussed, we expect stronger creditor and shareholder rights and more efficient 
debt enforcement (shorter time to payment and lower cost) to be associated with lower 
loan spreads.  This is exactly what we find.  It is more interesting, however, that the 
coefficients on the wedge-shareholder rights, wedge-creditor rights, and wedge-debt 
enforcement efficiency interaction terms are all statistically significant and bear the 
expected signs.  The positive association between the control-ownership wedge and loan 
spreads is weakened for firms in environments with strong creditor and shareholder rights 
and efficient debt enforcement.  
 
3.3.7. Financial crises 
 
As pointed out in previous studies (e.g., Lemmon and Lins, 2003), financial crises are 
relatively exogenous shocks, at least with respect to any individual firm, that significantly 
lower the available return on investment for firms in the affected countries.  Holding 
ownership structure constant, such shocks to returns lower the marginal cost to controlling 
shareholders of diverting resources away from profitable investment projects and increase 
the expected level of expropriation (Johnson et al., 2000b).  In addition, the legal rights 
of lenders and minority investors become relatively more important institutions against 
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controlling shareholders during times of crisis when growth prospects decline (Johnson et 
al., 2000b).  
We explore the effect of financial crises within a country’s banking system on the link 
between the control-ownership wedge and loan spreads in Table 12.  Financial crisis is a 
dummy variable that takes on the value one if the country is going through a system crisis 
in the observation year and zero if it is not.  A systemic crisis is a situation in which 
significant segments of the banking sector become insolvent or illiquid, and cannot 
continue to operate without special assistance from the monetary or supervisory authorities 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Beck et al., 2006).  Examples of special 
assistance include bank holidays, deposit freezes, blanket guarantees to depositors or other 
bank creditors, and large-scale nationalizations.  The banking crisis data are obtained 
from the Banking Crisis Database, a comprehensive database of banking crisis episodes, 
compiled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) economists (Honohan and Laeven, 
2005; Laeven and Valencia, 2008).27  
[Insert Table 12 here] 
 The results in Table 12 show that financial crises do exert a significant, positive 
impact on the link between the control-ownership wedge and loan spreads.  The 
divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights results in much higher costs of 
bank loans for the firms in countries experiencing financial crises.  For example, the 
coefficients in column 2 indicate that a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
control-ownership wedge increases loan spreads by 14% during normal periods and by 
20% during financial crises.  In columns 3 to 5, we further interact the interaction 
between the control-ownership wedge and the crisis indicator with measures for creditor 
rights and shareholder rights.  As before, strong creditor rights and shareholder rights are 
associated with lower loan spreads in general and lower wedge-loan spread sensitivity.  It 
                                                             
27 The banking crisis data set contains panel data with a sample period of 1972 to 2008 covering 93 
countries. 
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is also apparent that the effect of financial crises on the wedge-loan spread sensitivity is 
weakened in countries with stronger creditor rights and shareholder rights.  These results 
further stress the important role that laws and institutions play in mitigating tunneling and 
other potential credit risks from controlling shareholders and reducing corporate 




We study the financial consequences of the divergence between control rights and 
cash-flow rights in a large sample of companies across 22 East Asian and Western 
European countries during the period from 1996 to 2008.  Specifically, we analyze the 
effects of control rights-cash-flow rights divergence on firms’ cost of borrowing and 
provide new insights into the link between the separation of ownership and control and 
corporate value.  We find consistent evidence that the control rights-cash-flow rights 
divergence (control-ownership wedge) results in a much higher cost of debt financing 
(loan spreads).  The loan spreads-wedge sensitivity is much higher for family-controlled 
firms with family-connected CEOs, firms with greater informational opacity, lower credit 
ratings, and lower propping potentials, and firms during financial crises.  We also find a 
higher loan spreads-wedge sensitivity for bullet loans, loans with longer maturity, and 
loans without collateral or covenants.  On the other hand, the loan spreads-wedge 
sensitivity is lower for firms in countries with stronger creditor and shareholder protection 
and more efficient debt enforcement.  Overall, our results shed direct light on the channel 
through which the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights affects firm 
value and highlight the importance of ownership structure in determining the cost of 
corporate financing. 
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Table 1   
Definitions of variables   
 
This table provides detailed definitions for all the variables used in the paper. 
 
    
Variable names Variable definitions 
  Borrower ownership  
Control-ownership wedge The difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate 
owner of the firm 
High-wedge dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the share of control rights of the firm’s largest 
ultimate owner exceeds the share of cash-flow rights and if this difference is higher than 
the median difference in firms where the control-ownership wedge is greater than zero 
Low-wedge dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the share of control rights of the firm’s largest 
ultimate owner exceeds the share of cash-flow rights and if this difference is less than or 
equal to the median difference in firms where the control-ownership wedge is greater 
than zero 
Cash-flow rights The cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm 
Family dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the largest ultimate owner of the firm is a family 
and zero otherwise 
Family CEO dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is a family member of the controlling 
family and zero otherwise 
State dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the largest ultimate owner of the firm is the state 
and zero otherwise 
  
Borrower characteristics  
S&P ratings S&P firm credit ratings are converted to an index from one to seven as follows: 1 = 
Aaa, 2 = Aa, 3 = A, 4 = Bbb, 5 = Bb, 6 = B or worse, and 7 = no rating 
No rating dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the firm does not have an S&P credit rating and 
zero otherwise 
Leverage  (Long-term debt + debt in current liabilities) / total assets  
Log assets Natural log of total assets measured in millions of US dollars 
Profitability  Net income / total assets 
Q (Market value of equity + Book value of debt) / total assets.  Market value of equity 
equals price per share times total number of shares outstanding.  Book value of debt 
equals total assets minus book value of equity. 
Tangibility Net property, plant, and equipment / total assets 
Cash-flow volatility Standard deviation of quarterly cash flows from operations over the four fiscal years 
prior to the loan initiation year scaled by total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current 
liabilities) 
Stock index inclusion A dummy variable that equals one if the firm is included in the national major stock 
index and zero otherwise 
Number of analysts Total number of stock analysts following the firm 
Investment grade A dummy variable that equals one if the S&P rating is BBB or better and zero otherwise 
Propping potential The total value of the assets of all firms that lie underneath the borrowing firm's 
position in the pyramid, divided by the borrowing firm’s total assets (an upper bound 
measure); or a weighted sum of the values of the assets of all firms that lie underneath 
the borrowing firm in the pyramid divided by the borrowing firm’s total assets, with the 
weight for each firm lower down in the pyramid beneath the borrower defined as the 
control rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder on that firm (the more conservative 
measure) 
  
(continued on the next page) 
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Table 1 
Definitions of variables  
(Continued) 
   
Variable names Variable definitions 
Loan characteristics  
Log loan spreads Natural log of the loan spread.  Loan spread is the all-in-spread drawn, defined as the amount 
the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or LIBOR equivalent for the drawn portion of 
the loan facility. 
Log loan size  Natural log of the loan facility amount, measured in millions of US dollars 
Log loan maturity Natural log of the loan maturity measured in days 
Performance pricing dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the loan uses performance pricing and zero otherwise 
Term loan dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the loan facility is a term loan and zero otherwise 
Loan purpose dummies Dummy variables for loan purposes, including refinancing, acquisition, capital expenditure, 
backup line, working capital, corporate purposes, and others 
Bullet loan dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the loan facility is a bullet loan and zero otherwise 
Number of covenants Total number of covenants for the loan 
Collateral dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the loan is secured by collateral and zero otherwise 
  Macroeconomic factors  
Creditor rights An index aggregating creditor rights (La Porta et al., 1998; Djankov et al., 2007).  This index 
consists of four components:  (1) whether there are restrictions imposed, such as creditors’ 
consent, when a debtor files for reorganization (Restrictions on reorganization); (2) whether 
secured creditors have the ability to seize collateral after the petition for reorganization is 
approved (No automatic stay); (3) whether secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution 
of proceeds from liquidation as opposed to other creditors such as employees (Secured creditor 
paid first); and (4) whether an administrator, rather than the incumbent management, is in 
control of and responsible for running the business during the reorganization (No management 
stay).  A value of one is added to the index when a country’s laws and regulations provide 
each of these powers to secured creditors to arrive at the aggregate creditor rights index.  The 
aggregate creditor rights index ranges from zero to four, with higher values indicating stronger 
creditor rights. 
Sovereign risk rating Moody’s ratings on the long-term sovereign (government) bonds for the borrower’s country 
(denominated in US dollars) are converted into an index from one to six as follows: 1 = Aaa, 2 
= Aa, 3 = A, 4 = Bbb, 5 = Bb, and 6 = B or worse 
Private credit to GDP Private credit by commercial banks and other financial institutions / GDP 
Log GDP per capita Natural log of the real GDP per capita in US dollars (USD) 
Anti-self-dealing An index computed based on the survey of a hypothetical self-dealing case among attorneys 
from Lex Mundi law firms in 102 countries (Djankov et al., 2008b).  Higher values indicate 
better protection of investors against self-dealing by controlling shareholders. 
Anti-director An index compiled by La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. (2008b).  This index is formed 
by adding one when: (1) shareholders are allowed to mail in their proxy votes to the firm; (2) 
shareholders are not required to deposit shares before any general shareholders’ meeting; (3) 
cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board is allowed; (4) 
minority shareholders have legal mechanisms against perceived oppression by the board; (5) 
the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for a special 
shareholders’ meeting is no more than 10%; or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can 
be waived only by a shareholders’ vote.  The index ranges from zero to six with higher values 
indicating stronger investor protection against insider expropriation.   
Time to payment The estimated number of years from the moment of a firm's default to the time when the 
secured creditor gets paid in each country (Djankov et al., 2008a) 
Cost of debt enforcement The estimated cost of the insolvency proceeding borne by all parties divided by the value of the 
insolvency estate in each country (Djankov et al., 2008a) 
Financial crisis dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the country is going through a financial crisis in the 
observation year and zero if it is not.  Crisis data are obtained from the Banking Crisis 
Database, a comprehensive database of banking crisis episodes, compiled by IMF economists 
(Honohan and Laeven, 2005; Laeven and Valencia, 2008). 
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Table 2   
Summary statistics 
 
This table presents the mean, standard deviation (STD), and number of observations (N) for all the 
variables used in the paper.  The sample consists of 13,331 bank loans made to 3,468 firms in 22 
Western European and East Asian countries during the period from 1996 to 2008.  Definitions of all 
the variables are reported in Table 1.  
 
Variable names Mean STD N 
    Borrower ownership 
   Control-ownership wedge 0.061 0.126 13,331 
High-wedge dummy 0.119 0.324 13,331 
Low-wedge dummy 0.122 0.327 13,331 
Cash-flow rights 0.259 0.251 13,331 
Family dummy 0.452 0.497 13,331 
Family CEO dummy 0.077 0.266 13,331 
State dummy 0.069 0.252 13,331 
    Borrower characteristics 
   S&P ratings 1.169 1.742 13,331 
No rating dummy 0.380 0.485 13,331 
Leverage 0.334 0.299 13,331 
Total assets ($MM) 4,849 21,020 13,331 
Profitability 0.091 0.079 13,331 
Q 1.337 0.511 13,331 
Tangibility 0.530 0.272 13,331 
Cash-flow volatility 2.073 2.287 13,331 
Stock index inclusion 0.763 0.425 13,331 
Number of analysts 11.345 11.862 13,331 
Propping potential (upper bound) 0.462 0.735 13,331 
Propping potential (conservative) 0.094 0.152 13,331 
Investment grade 0.412 0.492 13,331 
    Loan characteristics 
   Loan spreads (basis points) 195.352 174.096 13,331 
Loan size ($MM)  369 1,120 13,197 
Loan maturity (days)  1,608 1,025 13,103 
Performance pricing dummy 0.064 0.245 13,331 
Term loan dummy 0.407 0.491 13,331 
Bullet loan dummy 0.229 0.420 13,331 
Number of covenants 6.723 3.715 13,331 
Collateral dummy 0.326 0.469 13,331 
    Macroeconomic factors 
   Creditor rights 2.494 1.279 13,331 
Sovereign risk rating 1.691 0.897 13,331 
Private credit to GDP 1.156 0.672 13,331 
GDP per capita 21,046 9,185 13,331 
Anti-self-dealing 0.627 0.261 13,331 
Anti-director 3.845 0.853 13,331 
Time to payment 1.416 1.001 13,331 
Cost of debt enforcement 0.085 0.056 13,331 
Financial crisis dummy 0.246 0.431 13,331 
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Table 3  
The effect of the control-ownership wedge on loan pricing 
 
This table presents the regression results on the effect of the control-ownership wedge on loan pricing.  The 
sample consists of 13,331 bank loans made to 3,468 firms in 22 Western European and East Asian countries 
during the period from 1996 to 2008.  The dependent variable is the log loan spread for a single bank loan.  The 
control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest 
ultimate owner of the firm.  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1.  P-Values based on 
robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
High-wedge dummy 0.252 0.285 0.248 0.184 
    
 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.003]*** 
    Low-wedge dummy 0.138 0.132 0.120 0.087 
    
 
[0.002]*** [0.015]** [0.016]** [0.027]** 
    Control-ownership wedge 
    
1.541 1.533 1.433 1.127 
 
    
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.007]*** [0.008]*** 
Cash-flow rights -0.427 -0.412 -0.411 -0.378 -0.354 -0.391 -0.402 -0.369 
 
[0.019]** [0.006]*** [0.027]** [0.029]** [0.026]** [0.042]** [0.030]** [0.032]** 
Leverage 0.654 0.604 0.412 0.367 0.504 0.476 0.415 0.379 
 
[0.168] [0.115] [0.059]* [0.068]* [0.028]** [0.053]* [0.057]* [0.065]* 
Tangibility -0.201 -0.183 -0.130 -0.115 -0.13 -0.163 -0.125 -0.110 
 
[0.060]* [0.191] [0.010]** [0.012]** [0.104] [0.137] [0.010]*** [0.011]** 
Log assets -0.436 -0.406 -0.339 -0.321 -0.371 -0.356 -0.332 -0.316 
 
[0.026]** [0.046]** [0.033]** [0.037]** [0.053]* [0.029]** [0.037]** [0.040]** 
Profitability  -0.948 -0.84 -0.881 -0.786 -0.63 -0.646 -0.862 -0.771 
 
[0.030]** [0.182] [0.065]* [0.090]* [0.027]** [0.196] [0.072]* [0.094]* 
Cash-flow volatility 0.020 0.019 0.015 0.014 0.022 0.025 0.017 0.016 
 
[0.189] [0.014]** [0.206] [0.238] [0.052]* [0.060]* [0.106] [0.129] 
S&P ratings 
   
0.126 
   
0.137 
 
   
[0.061]* 
   
[0.069]* 
No rating dummy 
   
0.142 
   
0.131 
 
   
[0.102] 
   
[0.094]* 
Q 
   
-0.104 
   
-0.099 
 
   
[0.058]* 
   
[0.061]* 
Performance pricing dummy 
 
-0.031 -0.018 -0.016 
 
-0.023 -0.020 -0.018 
 
 
[0.029]** [0.058]* [0.062]* 
 
[0.017]** [0.051]* [0.054]* 
Term loan dummy 
 
0.050 0.041 0.038 
 
0.055 0.04 0.038 
 
 
[0.017]** [0.034]** [0.037]** 
 
[0.041]** [0.033]** [0.035]** 
Log loan size  
 
-0.034 -0.029 -0.027 
 
-0.036 -0.031 -0.029 
 
 
[0.025]** [0.059]* [0.063]* 
 
[0.030]** [0.057]* [0.061]* 
Log loan maturity  
 
0.098 0.079 0.074 
 
0.086 0.080 0.074 
 
 
[0.034]** [0.057]* [0.061]* 
 
[0.011]** [0.054]* [0.058]* 
 
(continued on the next page) 
  





Table 3  
The effect of the control-ownership wedge on loan pricing 
(Continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 








































         Loan purpose dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 13,331 12,973 12,973 12,973 13,331 12,973 12,973 12,973 
Number of Firms 3,468 3,402 3,402 3,402 3,468 3,402 3,402 3,402 




     45 
 
 
Table 4   
Instrumental variables estimation 
 
This table presents the results of instrumental variables estimations of the effect of the 
control-ownership wedge on loan pricing.  The sample consists of 13,331 bank loans made to 
3,468 firms in 22 Western European and East Asian countries during the period from 1996 to 2008.  
The dependent variable is the log loan spread.  The control-ownership wedge is defined as the 
difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  
The instruments for the control-ownership wedge and cash-flow rights are the initial industry 
average difference between control rights and cash-flow rights and the initial industry average 
cash-flow rights, respectively.  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1.  
P-Values based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets.  Significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
        
  (1) (2) (3) 
Control-ownership wedge 2.424 2.291 2.018 
 
[0.000]*** [0.007]*** [0.006]*** 
Cash-flow rights -0.747 -0.848 -0.771 
 
[0.021]** [0.002]*** [0.014]** 
S&P ratings 0.194 0.179 0.155 
 
[0.014]** [0.036]** [0.070]* 
No rating dummy 0.146 0.130 0.128 
 
[0.046]** [0.133] [0.074]* 
Leverage 0.426 0.340 0.211 
 
[0.034]** [0.089]* [0.067]* 
Tangibility -0.118 -0.106 -0.096 
 
[0.031]** [0.097]* [0.071]* 
Log assets -0.329 -0.312 -0.265 
 
[0.085]* [0.028]** [0.031]** 
Q -0.095 -0.121 -0.106 
 
[0.029]** [0.073]* [0.053]* 
Profitability  -0.570 -0.511 -0.502 
 
[0.032]** [0.182] [0.107] 
Cash-flow volatility 0.022 0.020 0.019 
 
[0.046]** [0.061]* [0.127] 

























(continued on the next page) 
 





Table 4   




  (1) (2) (3) 
























    Loan purpose dummies No Yes Yes 
Industry effects No Yes Yes 
Time effects No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 13,331 12,973 12,973 
Number of firms 3,468 3,402 3,402 











This table presents the OLS regression results on the effect of changes in the borrower control-ownership 
wedge on changes in loan pricing.  The sample consists of bank loans made to firms in 22 Western European and 
East Asian countries during the period from 1996 to 2008.  The dependent variable is the change in the log loan 
spread.  The control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash-flow 
rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1.  
P-Values based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
∆ Control-ownership wedge 1.375 1.349 1.266 
 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.003]*** 
∆ Cash-flow rights -0.276 -0.262 -0.268 
 
[0.029]** [0.032]** [0.037]** 



































∆ Log loan size  
  
-0.046 
   
[0.065]* 
∆ Log loan maturity  
  
0.047 
   
[0.084]* 
∆ Sovereign risk rating 
  
0.128 
   
[0.237] 
∆ Creditor rights 
  
-0.264 
   
[0.038]** 
∆ Private credit to GDP 
  
0.478 
   
[0.026]** 
∆ Log GDP per capita 
  
-0.023 
   
[0.081]* 
Constant -0.051 -0.049 -0.028 
 
[0.067]* [0.152] [0.324] 
    Number of observations 2,038 2,038 2,038 
Number of firms 1,037 1,037 1,037 
Adjusted R2 0.104 0.126 0.142 
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Table 6   
Ownership identity and the effect of the control-ownership wedge on loan pricing 
 
This table presents the regression results on the effect of ownership identity on the relation between the control-ownership wedge 
and loan pricing.  The sample consists of bank loans made to firms in 22 Western European and East Asian countries during the 
period from 1996 to 2008.  The dependent variable is the log loan spread.  The control-ownership wedge is defined as the 
difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Family dummy equals one if the 
largest ultimate owner of the firm is a family and zero otherwise.  Family CEO dummy equals one if the CEO is a family member of 
the controlling family and zero otherwise.  State dummy equals one if the largest ultimate owner of the firm is the state and zero 
otherwise.  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1.  P-Values based on robust standard errors clustered by firm 
are reported in brackets.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Control-ownership wedge 1.309 1.300 1.287 1.113 
 
[0.012]** [0.004]*** [0.008]*** [0.029]** 
Family dummy 0.225 0.222 0.223 0.221 
 
[0.014]** [0.026]** [0.012]** [0.018]** 
Family x Wedge 
 
0.544 0.510 0.504 
 
 
[0.003]*** [0.018]** [0.023]** 













   
-0.055 
 
   
[0.081]* 
State x Wedge 
   
-0.249 
 
   
[0.036]** 
Cash-flow rights -0.435 -0.478 -0.386 -0.421 
 
[0.023]** [0.014]** [0.028]** [0.032]** 
S&P ratings -0.138 -0.121 -0.108 0.093 
 
[0.026]** [0.051]* [0.020]** [0.059]* 
No rating dummy -0.184 -0.174 -0.131 0.145 
 
[0.026]** [0.053]* [0.032]** [0.092]* 
Leverage 0.316 0.337 0.316 0.360 
 
[0.032]** [0.056]* [0.031]** [0.029]** 
Tangibility -0.135 -0.135 -0.138 -0.186 
 
[0.084]* [0.043]** [0.079]* [0.095]* 
Log assets -0.147 -0.144 -0.146 -0.311 
 
[0.032]** [0.041]** [0.061]* [0.051]* 
Q -0.067 -0.061 -0.067 -0.062 
 
[0.032]** [0.075]* [0.067]* [0.088]* 
Profitability  -0.772 -0.773 -0.764 -0.794 
 
[0.092]* [0.011]** [0.072]* [0.020]** 
Cash-flow volatility 0.017 0.014 0.015 0.014 
  [0.077]* [0.018]** [0.016]** [0.038]** 
 
(continued on the next page) 




Table 6  
Ownership identity and the effect of the control-ownership wedge on loan pricing  
(Continued) 
 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Performance pricing dummy -0.012 -0.015 -0.018 -0.015 
 
[0.046]** [0.091]* [0.024]** [0.184] 
Term loan dummy 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.038 
 
[0.035]** [0.063]* [0.016]** [0.035]** 
Log loan size  -0.026 -0.023 -0.031 -0.029 
 
[0.033]** [0.162] [0.071]* [0.048]** 
Log loan maturity  0.094 0.069 0.053 0.074 
 
[0.078]* [0.034]** [0.069]* [0.039]** 
Sovereign risk rating -0.156 -0.154 -0.173 0.197 
 
[0.127] [0.108] [0.034]** [0.066]* 
Creditor rights -0.135 -0.117 -0.143 -0.131 
 
[0.027]** [0.028]** [0.065]* [0.055]* 
Private credit to GDP 0.425 0.596 0.409 0.397 
 
[0.043]** [0.057]* [0.144] [0.029]** 
Log GDP per capita -0.022 -0.034 -0.040 -0.036 
 
[0.063]* [0.016]** [0.182] [0.092]* 
     Loan purpose dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 12,593 12,593 12,593 12,593 
Number of firms 3,276 3,276 3,276 3,276 
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Table 7   
Borrowing firm informational opacity and the effect of the control-ownership wedge on loan 
pricing 
 
This table presents the regression results on the effect of borrowing firm informational opacity on the 
relation between the control-ownership wedge and loan pricing.  The sample consists of bank loans made to 
firms in 22 Western European and East Asian countries during the period from 1996 to 2008.  The dependent 
variable is the log loan spread.  The control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the 
control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  No rating dummy equals one if 
the firm does not have an S&P credit rating and zero otherwise.  Stock index inclusion is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the firm is included in a national major stock index and zero otherwise.  Number of 
analysts is the total number of stock analysts following the firm.  Definitions of all the other variables are 
reported in Table 1.  P-Values based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets.  
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Control-ownership wedge 1.273 1.299 1.147 1.146 
 
[0.006]*** [0.012]** [0.014]** [0.003]*** 
















Stock index inclusion x Wedge 
  
-0.239  
   
[0.003]***  
Stock index inclusion 
  
-0.055  
   
[0.025]**  
Number of analysts x Wedge 
   
-0.262 
    
[0.006]*** 
Number of analysts 
   
-0.580 
    
[0.029]** 
No rating dummy  0.151 0.125 0.160 0.245 
 
[0.037]** [0.008]*** [0.095]* [0.076]* 
Log assets -0.224 -0.306 -0.333 -0.287 
 
[0.058]* [0.038]** [0.033]** [0.063]* 
Cash-flow rights -0.350 -0.348 -0.346 -0.415 
  [0.032]** [0.017]** [0.048]** [0.025]** 
 
 











Borrowing firm informational opacity and the effect of the control-ownership wedge on loan 
pricing  
(Continued) 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) 
S&P ratings 0.120 0.118 0.127 0.084 
 
[0.060]* [0.063]* [0.040]** [0.062]* 
Leverage 0.458 0.379 0.421 0.252 
 
[0.060]* [0.066]* [0.034]** [0.037]** 
Tangibility -0.104 -0.113 -0.107 -0.181 
 
[0.115] [0.027]** [0.011]** 0.252 
Q -0.098 -0.101 -0.105 -0.106 
 
[0.061]* [0.041]** [0.056]* [0.049]** 
Profitability  -0.763 -0.781 -0.759 -0.715 
 
[0.123] [0.082]* [0.094]* [0.025]** 
Cash-flow volatility 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.013 
 
[0.019]** [0.096]* [0.062]* [0.040]** 
Performance pricing dummy -0.017 -0.023 -0.018 -0.016 
 
[0.147] [0.059]* [0.118] [0.142] 
Term loan dummy 0.038 0.040 0.038 0.039 
 
[0.031]** [0.027]** [0.036]** [0.033]** 
Log loan size  -0.029 -0.037 -0.026 -0.029 
 
[0.173] [0.048]** [0.264] [0.010]** 
Log loan maturity  0.078 0.074 0.079 0.074 
 
[0.087]* [0.103] [0.042]** [0.045]** 
Sovereign rating 0.180 0.176 0.178 0.146 
 
[0.124] [0.131] [0.122] [0.042]** 
Creditor rights -0.164 -0.153 -0.152 -0.137 
 
[0.025]** [0.021]** [0.036]** [0.061]* 
Private credit/GDP 0.374 0.375 0.383 0.402 
 
[0.124] [0.066]* [0.022]** [0.041]** 
Log GDP per capita -0.035 -0.035 -0.037 -0.038 
 
[0.175] [0.132] [0.090]* [0.085]* 
Loan purpose dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 12,593 12,593 12,593 12,593 
Number of firms 3,276 3,276 3,276 3,276 
Adjusted R2 0.235 0.232 0.234 0.235 
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Table 8  
Borrowing firm credit rating and the effect of the control-ownership wedge on loan pricing 
 
This table presents the regression results on the effect of borrowing firm credit rating on the relation 
between the control-ownership wedge and loan pricing.  The sample consists of bank loans made to firms in 
22 Western European and East Asian countries during the period from 1996 to 2008.  The dependent 
variable is the log loan spread.  The control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the 
control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Investment-grade dummy 
equals one if the borrowing firm credit rating is BBB or better and zero otherwise.  Definitions of all the 
other variables are reported in Table 1.  P-Values based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are 
reported in brackets.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
     (1) (2) 
Control-ownership wedge 1.054 1.167 
 
[0.006]*** [0.004]*** 


















Cash-flow rights -0.378 -0.374 
 
[0.021]** [0.028]** 
No rating dummy  0.116 0.127 
 
[0.097]* [0.039]** 
Leverage 0.372 0.381 
 
[0.066]* [0.062]* 
Tangibility -0.119 -0.116 
 
[0.018]** [0.051]* 
Log assets -0.320 -0.314 
 
[0.039]** [0.040]** 
Q -0.101 -0.091 
 
[0.080]* [0.136] 
Profitability  -0.779 -0.766 
 
[0.089]* [0.094]* 
Cash-flow volatility 0.015 0.017 
  [0.126] [0.126] 
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Table 8  
Borrowing firm credit rating and the effect of the control-ownership wedge on loan pricing 
(Continued) 
 
      
  (1) (2) 
Performance pricing dummy -0.017 -0.012 
 
[0.053]* [0.160] 
Term loan dummy 0.039 0.036 
 
[0.031]** [0.029]** 
Log loan size  -0.027 -0.028 
 
[0.067]* [0.072]* 
Log loan maturity  0.071 0.073 
 
[0.062]* [0.055]* 
Sovereign rating 0.171 0.173 
 
[0.143] [0.131] 
Creditor rights -0.152 -0.151 
 
[0.029]** [0.028]** 
Private credit/GDP 0.388 0.389 
 
[0.122] [0.077]* 
Log GDP per capita -0.034 -0.032 
 
[0.068]* [0.061]* 
Loan purpose dummies Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations 12,973 12,973 
Number of firms 3,402 3,402 
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Table 9 
Borrowing firm propping potential and the effect of the control-ownership wedge on loan pricing 
 
This table presents the regression results on the effect of borrowing firm propping potential on the 
relation between the control-ownership wedge and loan pricing.  The sample consists of bank loans made to 
firms in 22 Western European and East Asian countries during the period from 1996 to 2008.  The dependent 
variable is the log loan spread.  The control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the 
control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Propping potential is computed 
in the first two columns as the total value of the assets of all firms that lie underneath the borrowing firm's 
position in the pyramid, divided by the borrowing firm’s total assets, and in the last two columns as a 
weighted sum of the values of the assets of all firms that lie underneath the borrowing firm in the pyramid 
divided by the borrowing firm’s total assets, with the weight for each firm lower down in the pyramid beneath 
the borrower defined as the control rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder on that firm.  Definitions of 
all the other variables are reported in Table 1.  P-Values based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are 
reported in brackets.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Control-ownership wedge 1.270 1.316 1.284 1.302 
 
[0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.007]*** 
Propping potential -0.104 -0.108 -0.583 -0.522 
 
[0.016]** [0.006]*** [0.027]** [0.011]** 









Cash-flow rights -0.371 -0.375 -0.369 -0.381 
 
[0.025]** [0.026]** [0.028]** [0.024]** 
S&P ratings 0.134 0.127 0.135 0.132 
 
[0.032]** [0.076]* [0.069]* [0.073]* 
No rating dummy  0.168 0.139 0.173 0.149 
 
[0.082]* [0.126] [0.034]** [0.116] 
Leverage 0.378 0.407 0.378 0.395 
 
[0.066]* [0.031]** [0.121] [0.063]* 
Tangibility -0.115 -0.11 -0.114 -0.115 
 
[0.024]** [0.062]* [0.057]* [0.023]** 
Log assets -0.293 -0.307 -0.312 -0.308 
 
[0.069]* [0.044]** [0.040]** [0.042]** 
Q -0.088 -0.085 -0.084 -0.086 
 
[0.112] [0.123] [0.109] [0.117] 
Profitability  -0.740 -0.730 -0.742 -0.736 
 
[0.080]* [0.142] [0.079]* [0.084]* 
Cash-flow volatility 0.016 0.021 0.018 0.017 
  [0.146] [0.032]** [0.113] [0.142] 
 
(continued on the next page) 
 




Borrowing firm propping potential and the effect of the control-ownership wedge on loan pricing 
(Continued) 
 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Performance pricing dummy -0.014 -0.016 -0.019 -0.015 
 
[0.129] [0.074]* [0.028]** [0.057]* 
Term loan dummy 0.039 0.032 0.042 0.034 
 
[0.065]* [0.223] [0.035]** [0.218] 
Log loan size  -0.031 -0.026 -0.028 -0.027 
 
[0.032]** [0.061]* [0.061]* [0.064]* 
Log loan maturity  0.070 0.072 0.073 0.069 
 
[0.051]* [0.065]* [0.029]** [0.062]* 
Sovereign rating 0.163 0.164 0.163 0.162 
 
[0.124] [0.123] [0.123] [0.131] 
Creditor rights -0.150 -0.147 -0.151 -0.149 
 
[0.026]** [0.029]** [0.025]** [0.027]** 
Private credit/GDP 0.420 0.322 0.381 0.329 
 
[0.034]** [0.219] [0.071]* [0.118] 
Log GDP per capita -0.031 -0.028 -0.033 -0.027 
 
[0.072]* [0.129] [0.071]* [0.121] 
Loan purpose dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 12,973 12,973 12,973 12,973 
Number of firms 3,402 3,402 3,402 3,402 











Loan terms and the effect of the control-ownership wedge on loan pricing  
 
This table presents the regression results on the effect of various loan features on the relation between 
the control-ownership wedge and loan pricing.  The sample consists of bank loans made to firms in 22 
Western European and East Asian countries during the period from 1996 to 2008.  The dependent variable is 
the log loan spread.  The control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights 
and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Bullet loan dummy is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the loan facility is a bullet loan and zero otherwise.  Log loan maturity is the natural log of the 
loan maturity measured in days.  Number of covenants is the total number of covenants for the loan.  
Collateral dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the loan facility is secured by collateral and zero 
otherwise.  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1.  P-Values based on robust standard 
errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by 
*, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Control-ownership wedge 1.199 1.202 1.147 1.158 
 
[0.021]** [0.020]** [0.029]** [0.026]** 














Log loan maturity x Wedge 
 
0.655   
  
[0.004]***   




   
[0.000]*** 




   
[0.007]*** 
 Collateral dummy 
   
-0.059 
    
[0.000]*** 
Collateral x Wedge 
   
-0.039 
    
[0.014]** 
Log loan maturity  0.071 0.077 0.089 0.088 
 
[0.042]** [0.029]** [0.012]** [0.016]** 
Cash-flow rights -0.391 -0.334 -0.342 -0.358 
  [0.016]** [0.029]** [0.017]** [0.028]** 
 











Loan terms and the effect of the control-ownership wedge on loan pricing 
(Continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
S&P ratings 0.185 0.135 0.173 0.175 
 
[0.031]** [0.057]* [0.064]* [0.036]** 
No rating dummy 0.141 0.213 0.169 0.143 
 
[0.095]* [0.039]** [0.029]** [0.051]* 
Leverage 0.300 0.375 0.324 0.309 
 
[0.068]* [0.066]* [0.047]** [0.079]* 
Tangibility -0.113 -0.114 -0.136 -0.154 
 
[0.024]** [0.011]** [0.078]* [0.062]* 
Log assets -0.443 -0.313 -0.328 -0.316 
 
[0.033]** [0.036]** [0.031]** [0.037]** 
Q -0.080 -0.100 -0.113 -0.117 
 
[0.092]* [0.041]** [0.094]* [0.087]* 
Profitability  -0.864 -0.775 -0.823 -0.615 
 
[0.038]** [0.089]* [0.037]** [0.064]* 
Cash-flow volatility 0.018 0.014 0.019 0.011 
 
[0.022]** [0.063]* [0.135] [0.072]* 
Performance pricing dummy -0.019 -0.018 0.016 0.017 
 
[0.155] [0.061]* [0.037]** [0.052]* 
Term loan dummy 0.027 0.038 0.037 0.041 
 
[0.036]** [0.020]** [0.024]** [0.019]** 
Log loan size  -0.026 -0.029 -0.027 -0.031 
 
[0.177] [0.036]** [0.031]** [0.039]** 
Sovereign risk rating 0.105 0.180 0.156 0.139 
 
[0.208] [0.117] [0.038]** [0.067]* 
Creditor rights -0.174 -0.152 -0.179 -0.186 
 
[0.036]** [0.026]** [0.023]** [0.029]** 
Private credit to GDP 0.345 0.390 0.362 0.287 
 
[0.172] [0.040]** [0.087]* [0.039]** 
Log GDP per capita -0.023 -0.035 -0.024 -0.028 
 
[0.060]* [0.432] [0.037]** [0.076]* 
Loan purpose dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 12,593 12,593 12,593 12,593 
Number of firms 3,276 3,276 3,276 3,276 
Adjusted R2 0.271 0.234 0.231 0.246 




Legal rights, debt enforcement efficiency, and the effect of the control-ownership wedge on loan pricing 
 
This table presents the regression results on the effect of creditor rights and shareholder rights on the relation 
between the control-ownership wedge and loan pricing.  The sample consists of bank loans made to firms in 22 
Western European and East Asian countries during the period from 1996 to 2008.  The dependent variable is the log 
loan spread.  The control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash-flow 
rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  The creditor rights variable is an index aggregating creditor rights 
(La Porta et al., 1998; Djankov et al., 2007) ranging from zero to four, with higher values indicating stronger creditor 
rights.  Anti-self-dealing is an index compiled by Djankov et al. (2008b), with higher values indicating better 
protection of investors against self-dealing by controlling shareholders.  Anti-director is an index compiled by La 
Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. (2008b) ranging from zero to six, with higher values indicating stronger 
investor protection against insider expropriation.  Time to payment is the estimated number of years from the 
moment of a firm's default to the time when the secured creditor gets paid in each country (Djankov et al., 2008a).  
Cost of debt enforcement is the estimated cost of the insolvency proceeding borne by all parties divided by the value 
of the insolvency estate in each country (Djankov et al., 2008a).  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in 
Table 1.  P-Values based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets.  Significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Control-ownership wedge 1.242 1.231 1.227 1.411 1.304 
 
[0.006]*** [0.004]*** [0.031]** [0.018]** [0.002]*** 
Creditor rights -0.280 -0.318 -0.335 -0.236 -0.172 
 
[0.005]*** [0.032]** [0.029]** [0.034]** [0.039]** 
Creditor rights x Wedge -0.242 
    
 
[0.002]*** 
    Anti-self-dealing 
 
-0.293 




   Anti-self-dealing x Wedge 
 
-0.742 


















  Time to payment 




   
[0.006]*** 
 Time to payment x Wedge 




   
[0.012]** 
 Cost of enforcement 
    
0.019 
 
    
[0.027]** 
Cost of enforcement x Wedge 
    
0.289 
 
    
[0.034]** 
Cash-flow rights -0.450 -0.404 -0.400 -0.370 -0.401 
  [0.031]** [0.033]** [0.033]** [0.026]** [0.032]** 
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Legal rights, debt enforcement efficiency, and the effect of the control-ownership wedge on loan pricing 
(Continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
S&P ratings 0.107 0.100 0.089 0.104 0.106 
 
[0.067]* [0.057]* [0.043]** [0.063]* [0.045]** 
No rating dummy 0.157 0.173 0.214 0.129 0.145 
 
[0.086]* [0.091]* [0.059]* [0.094]* [0.270] 
Leverage 0.270 0.257 0.210 0.289 0.275 
 
[0.064]* [0.096]* [0.046]** [0.157] [0.062]* 
Tangibility -0.109 -0.114 -0.116 -0.103 -0.104 
 
[0.027]** [0.070]* [0.142] [0.031]** [0.216] 
Log assets -0.315 -0.321 -0.328 -0.312 -0.314 
 
[0.037]** [0.089]* [0.026]** [0.057]* [0.162]* 
Q -0.101 -0.100 -0.118 -0.105 -0.104 
 
[0.154] [0.015]** [0.108] [0.327] [0.451] 
Profitability  -0.769 -0.768 -0.716 -0.674 -0.737 
 
[0.182] [0.027]** [0.066]* [0.142] [0.086]* 
Cash-flow volatility 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.017 0.012 
 
[0.063]* [0.092]* [0.173] [0.053]* [0.346] 
Performance pricing dummy -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 -0.014 -0.017 
 
[0.057]* [0.030]** [0.021]** [0.261] [0.082]* 
Term loan dummy 0.037 0.039 0.040 0.036 0.034 
 
[0.035]** [0.078]* [0.152] [0.141] [0.082]* 
Log loan size  -0.029 -0.029 -0.033 -0.031 -0.027 
 
[0.073]* [0.062]* [0.024]** [0.062]* [0.064]* 
Log loan maturity  0.074 0.075 0.076 0.089 0.091 
 
[0.029]** [0.019]** [0.032]** [0.031]** [0.025]** 
Sovereign risk rating 0.168 0.185 0.164 0.143 0.139 
 
[0.132] [0.141] [0.163] [0.127] [0.118] 
Private credit to GDP 0.389 0.385 0.352 0.358 0.365 
 
[0.021]** [0.078]* [0.027]** [0.036]** [0.141] 
Log GDP per capita -0.035 -0.035 -0.033 -0.026 -0.034 
 
[0.142] [0.028]** [0.025]** [0.176] [0.058]* 
Loan purpose dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 12,593 12,593 12,593 12,593 12,593 
Number of firms 3,276 3,276 3,276 3,276 3,276 
Adjusted R2 0.232 0.242 0.237 0.261 0.253 
     60 
 
Table 12 
Financial crises and the effect of the control-ownership wedge on loan pricing 
 
This table presents the regression results on the effect of financial crises on the relation between the 
control-ownership wedge and loan pricing.  The sample consists of bank loans made to firms in 22 Western 
European and East Asian countries during the period from 1996 to 2008.  The dependent variable is the log loan 
spread.  The control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights 
of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Financial crisis dummy equals one if the country is going through a 
financial crisis in the observation year and zero if it is not, defined according to the Banking Crisis Database, 
compiled by IMF economists (Honohan and Laeven, 2005; Laeven and Valencia, 2008).  Definitions of all the 
other variables are reported in Table 1.  P-Values based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in 
brackets.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Control-ownership wedge 1.184 1.117 1.190 1.116 1.157 
 
[0.008]*** [0.013]** [0.023]** [0.006]*** [0.035]** 
Financial crisis dummy 0.116 0.122 0.104 0.108 0.135 
 
[0.003]*** [0.039]** [0.024]** [0.030]** [0.007]*** 
Financial crisis x Wedge 
 
0.472 0.561 0.468 0.666 
 
 
[0.002]*** [0.029]** [0.028]** [0.026]** 





















  Anti-self-dealing 




   
[0.027]** 
 Anti-self-dealing x Financial crisis 




   
[0.007]*** 
 Anti-self-dealing x Wedge 




   
[0.005]*** 
 Anti-self-dealing x Financial crisis x Wedge 




   
[0.028]** 
 Anti-director 
    
-0.083 
 
    
[0.023]** 
Anti-director x Financial crisis 
    
-0.072 
 
    
[0.031]** 
Anti-director x Wedge 
    
-0.273 
 
    
[0.034]** 
Anti-director x Financial crisis x Wedge 
    
-0.223 
 
    
[0.036]** 
Creditor rights -0.153 -0.155 -0.185 -0.135 -0.189 
 
[0.023]*** [0.027]** [0.022]** [0.017]** [0.044]** 
Cash-flow rights -0.347 -0.349 -0.334 -0.338 -0.339 
  [0.034]** [0.016]** [0.033]** [0.042]** [0.045]** 
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Financial crises and the effect of the control-ownership wedge on loan pricing 
(Continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
S&P ratings 0.127 0.175 0.118 0.151 0.106 
 
[0.060]* [0.037]** [0.187] [0.178] [0.094]* 
No rating dummy 0.143 0.161 0.126 0.107 0.144 
 
[0.094]* [0.113] [0.031]** [0.128] [0.030]** 
Leverage 0.405 0.386 0.499 0.359 0.445 
 
[0.065]* [0.065]* [0.060]* [0.038]** [0.063]* 
Tangibility -0.111 -0.113 -0.093 -0.078 -0.100 
 
[0.011]** [0.017]** [0.013]** [0.014]** [0.012]** 
Log assets -0.320 -0.319 -0.299 -0.294 -0.316 
 
[0.038]** [0.067]* [0.062]* [0.041]** [0.037]** 
Q -0.100 -0.107 -0.114 -0.098 -0.103 
 
[0.060]* [0.155] [0.032]** [0.151] [0.057]* 
Profitability  -0.784 -0.825 -0.754 -0.763 -0.803 
 
[0.190] [0.040]** [0.093]* [0.119] [0.091]* 
Cash-flow volatility 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.014 
 
[0.024]** [0.121] [0.034]** [0.126] [0.081]* 
Performance pricing dummy -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 -0.019 -0.018 
 
[0.165] [0.167] [0.082]* [0.035]** [0.076]* 
Term loan dummy 0.039 0.037 0.040 0.037 0.038 
 
[0.032]** [0.034]** [0.038]** [0.036]** [0.030]** 
Log loan size  -0.029 -0.03 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 
 
[0.084]* [0.142] [0.159] [0.179] [0.171] 
Log loan maturity  0.074 0.073 0.076 0.075 0.074 
 
[0.125] [0.195] [0.040]** [0.087]* [0.190] 
Sovereign risk rating 0.173 0.178 0.136 0.129 0.187 
 
[0.126] [0.120] [0.196] [0.208] [0.128] 
Private credit to GDP 0.384 0.393 0.409 0.374 0.404 
 
[0.021]** [0.142] [0.195] [0.028]** [0.084]* 
Log GDP per capita -0.036 -0.032 -0.034 -0.033 -0.031 
 
[0.157] [0.089]* [0.151] [0.041]** [0.081]* 
Loan purpose dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 12,593 12,593 12,593 12,593 12,593 
Number of firms 3,276 3,276 3,276 3,276 3,276 
Adjusted R2 0.232 0.235 0.234 0.238 0.236 
 
 
